The Brain Network of Expectancy and Uncertainty Processing by Catena, Andrés et al.
The Brain Network of Expectancy and Uncertainty
Processing
Andre ´s Catena*, Jose ´ C. Perales, Alberto Megı ´as, Antonio Ca ´ndido, Elvia Jara, Antonio Maldonado
Departamento de Psicologı ´a Experimental, Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain
Abstract
Background: The Stimulus Preceding Negativity (SPN) is a non-motor slow cortical potential elicited by temporally
predictable stimuli, customarily interpreted as a physiological index of expectancy. Its origin would be the brain activity
responsible for generating the anticipatory mental representation of an expected upcoming event. The SPN manifests itself
as a slow cortical potential with negative slope, growing in amplitude as the stimulus approximates. The uncertainty
hypothesis we present here postulates that the SPN is linked to control-related areas in the prefrontal cortex that become
more active before the occurrence of an upcoming outcome perceived as uncertain.
Methods/Findings: We tested the uncertainty hypothesis by using a repeated measures design in a Human Contingency
Learning task with two levels of uncertainty. In the high uncertainty condition, the outcome is unpredictable. In the mid
uncertainty condition, the outcome can be learnt to be predicted in 75% of the trials. Our experiment shows that the
Stimulus Preceding Negativity is larger for probabilistically unpredictable (uncertain) outcomes than for probabilistically
predictable ones. sLoreta estimations of the brain activity preceding the outcome suggest that prefrontal and parietal areas
can be involved in its generation. Prefrontal sites activation (Anterior Cingulate and Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex) seems to
be related to the degree of uncertainty. Activation in posterior parietal areas, however, does not correlates with uncertainty.
Conclusions/Significance: We suggest that the Stimulus Preceding Negativity reflects the attempt to predict the outcome,
when posterior brain areas fail to generate a stable expectancy. Uncertainty is thus conceptualized, not just as the absence
of learned expectancy, but as a state with psychological and physiological entity.
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Introduction
Expectancies are an essential part of human adaptation to the
environment. The ability to anticipate future events allows us to
organize our behavior in preparation for the impact of those
events [1]. Nevertheless, expectancy is hardly ever perfect, so that
most events occur in the world with some degree of uncertainty. In
words of Baltasar Gracia ´n (1637/1892), ‘‘[the wise man] may
always hope for the best, but he always expects the worst, so as to
receive what comes with equanimity’’ [2]. The present study is
aimed at finding evidence about how, and where, uncertainty is
computed in the brain.
Previous literature provides a plausible candidate to start our
search. The stimulus preceding negativity (SPN) is a non-motor
slow cortical potential (SCP) elicited by temporally predictable
stimuli without any coupled motor requirements [3–4]. The SPN
manifests itself as a slow cortical potential (SCP) with negative
slope, growing in intensity as the stimulus approximates, and more
clearly observed in parietal and precentral locations [5].
To date, the SPN has been hypothesized to be a physiological
correlate of expectancy; that is, the origin of SPN would be the
brain activity responsible for generating the anticipatory mental
representation of an expected upcoming event. If this is true, the
SPN must be the result of learning, so it will appear gradually, as
the individual captures the regularities regarding the target
stimulus in her environment. Most importantly, only those stimuli
learnt to be predictable are expected to generate a significant SPN
effect. Our proposal – henceforth, the uncertainty hypothesis – is just
the opposite: it is not learned expectancy, but uncertainty, what
mainly generates the SPN. We will try to show that such a
hypothesis is compatible, not only with our own results, but also
with the evidence available in previous literature (and, actually, it
allows to reinterpreting previous results).
Expectancy is predominantly conceptualized as resulting from
activation spread from the perceived predictive cue along an
associative link, progressively generated during learning, provided
that the cue and the outcome were contingently and contiguously
presented [6]. Being unable to predict the upcoming event (the
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uncertainty has been traditionally equated with the absence of any
cognitive/physiological expectancy-related activity. Actually, a
number of SPN results seem to support this prediction. For
example, time estimation and decision-making tasks produce
larger SPN amplitudes for informative than for non-informative
outcomes [7]. SPN is also larger for rewards contingent on the
people’s choice than for those administered gratuitously or at
random [8]. Complementarily, in some studies, the effect has been
observed to depend more directly on the predicted motivational
value of the outcome than on its informative value [9], which has
led some authors to advocate that the SPN results, at least
partially, from the neural representation of the emotional value of
the upcoming feedback, and not only from its perceptual
representation [9–10].
In the case of a dichotomous event (present/absent), high
predictability of either its presence or its absence implies low
uncertainty. In the present experiment, only dichotomous events
are used, so uncertainty equals probabilitistic non-predictability of
the upcoming stimulus (correct/incorrect). In more complex tasks
(see [9]) there can be more that two possible results of predictions,
as, for example different categories representing degrees of
prediction correctness. In these cases, uncertainty is defined as
potential variability of the outcome. Other parameters being
equal, the more possible results of a prediction there exist, the
more uncertain the result will be.
However, it is important to make a distinction here between
merely probabilistic and psychological uncertainty. For a proba-
bilistically uncertain outcome to be also psychologically uncertain,
a previous prediction must be at stake. In principle, we cannot say
an individual is experiencing uncertainty about the future
occurrence of an outcome if she was not trying to predict it. Both
the generation of a prediction and the inability to confirm it in a
consistent manner are necessary ingredients of psychological
uncertainty. In addition, as it will be discussed later, although
incentive and uncertainty are essentially different variables, the
previous assertion also implies that uncertainty will produce
neurocognitive effects in combination with the motivational
relevance of the stimulus to be predicted.
Previous studies on SPN did not distinguish between probabi-
listic and psychological uncertainty. More specifically, control
conditions, designed to avoid expectancy, probably generated
disengagement from the task, and thus did not generate significant
psychological uncertainty. In the experiment described here, we
test whether the activity of the cortical sources supposedly involved
in the SPN, depends on the degree to which an outcome is
(un)expected.
Expectancy/uncertainty was generated by means of a one-cue
one-outcome human contingency learning task (HCL, see [11]), in
which the participant was asked to try to learn to predict the
presence/absence of an outcome (a fictitious disease) on the basis
of a cue (a fictitious medicine), on a trial-by-trial basis, and
received a payoff for each prediction. We were mainly interested
in the potential occurrence of the SPN in the interval between the
learner’s prediction and the occurrence of the outcome (or its
absence). Predictability of the outcome was controlled by
manipulating the degree of contingency between the cue and the
outcome. In accordance with the uncertainty hypothesis, we
expect SPN to be larger when the outcome is unpredictable than
when it is moderately predictable.
This HCL task presents several advantages over other tasks
commonly used for studying ERP indices of expectancy. First, and
most importantly, it allows a clear estimation of expectancy, and
thus of uncertainty. Expectancy can be computed as the
associative strength of associative models [12], or the conditional
probabilities entering the probabilistic-contrast model [13], and
uncertainty as an inverted U-shaped function over expectancy. In
our case, low uncertainty corresponds to high expectancy and vice
versa. And second, no contamination of motor or pre-motor
activity is expected, as the target SPN interval begins once the
response has already been made.
Parallel to the question of whether the SPN effect is linked to
psychological uncertainty or not (and how to check it), is the issue
of the neural source of such an effect. Converging evidence
supports the existence of several cortical brain areas involved in
the generation of SPN. First, dipole modeling [14–16] and fMRI
studies [17–18] have identified the insular cortex as the main
generator of SPN when feedback for a previous response conveys
motivationally relevant information. Second, the anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC) seems to be the best candidate generator when
negative affect cues are used [15]. Third, some authors have
proposed the involvement of dorsolateral prefrontal areas
(DLPFC) in the anticipation of future events [5,19–22]. And
fourth, an increase in parietal cortex activation has been observed
for temporal expectation tasks [23].
In contemporary learning theories, uncertainty is linked to
sustained attention, and thus to the controlled effort to keep on
learning when the events in the environment are not yet
predictable. Therefore, we can tentatively hypothesize that the
areas involved both in uncertainty computation and in SPN
generation will be also related with cognitive control. Among the
ones mentioned above, the best candidates are thus the ACC and
the DLPFC. sLORETA will be used to try to cast some light on
this issue. The potential role of other areas mentioned in the
literature (insula, parietal cortex), in a broader network, will also
be discussed.
In summary, the uncertainty hypothesis is related to the
occurrence of the SPN in the interval between the prediction
about an outcome and the occurrence of such an outcome. In
contrast with the general assumption, we expect the SPN-
Outcome amplitude to be larger in a condition in which outcomes
are unpredictable (high uncertainty) than in one in which they are
predictable (middle uncertainty). Complementarily, we postulate
the prefrontal cortex as the best candidate of the source of that
activation difference. The potential implication of other areas in
the SPN, and its relation with previous results will be discussed.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-two Psychology students (2 left handed;14 women;
median age: 20 years, range: 18–24) volunteered in the experiment
in exchange for course credits. All had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, were healthy, were not currently medicated, and
had not been previously diagnosed with any neurological disease.
All participants signed an informed consent form approved by the
Ethical Committee of the University of Granada and were treated
in accordance with the Helsinki declaration.
Apparatus, Stimuli and Procedure
Participants seated in individual chambers, approximately
60 cm away from a 17in high-resolution LCD monitor, where
all stimuli were presented. PC computers with Intel Core 2 DuoH
processors were used for controlling the task and registering both
behavioral and EEG data. The task was programmed, specifically
for the present experiment, using Visual Basic 6H. The order of
events in each task trial is depicted in Figure 1. Each trial
presented the participant with a fictitious case of a person who had
Expectancy, Uncertainty, and SPN
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given side effect (the potential outcome). Between the cue and the
outcome, the participant was asked to make a yes/no prediction
about the occurrence of the outcome (‘‘the side effect wil/will not
occur’’). The main manipulation involved the statistical relation-
ship between the cue and the outcome, and thus the predictability
of the outcome on the basis of the information provided on the
presence or absence of the cue.
Each trial commenced with a central fixation point. After
1500 ms, information on the cue was provided, that is, the
participant was informed whether the current case had taken the
drug or not. The labels for the two cues in the two contingency
conditions of the task were ‘‘perfluorato’’ and ‘‘dextroquinasa’’
(the assignation of labels to contingency conditions was balanced).
The pictures indicating the presence or absence of the cue (a
picture of several colored pills, or the same picture crossed off)
were 300 pixels high and 400 pixels wide.
Once information on the cue had been presented, the
participant predicted whether the outcome (the side effect) would
occur or not. As soon as the prediction made, it was marked
onscreen (yes/no), to prevent the participant to respond twice.
Keys M and Z in the keyboard were assigned, in a balanced
manner, to yes/no responses. All participants pressed the Z key
with their left hand, and M key with their right hand. Although the
cortical distribution of SCP could be changed by post-movement
effects produced by the motor response preceding it, the balanced
assignment of positive and negative responses to the right and left
hands (which makes sure that, on average, participants respond
the same number of times with the same hand on both conditions),
ensures that any uncertainty effect on SCP will be unaffected by
postmovement-related potentials. Once information on the cue
had been presented, the participant predicted whether the
outcome (the side effect) would occur or not. As soon as the
prediction made, it was marked onscreen (yes/no), to prevent the
participant to respond twice. Keys M and Z in the keyboard were
assigned, in a balanced manner, to yes/no responses. All
participants pressed the Z key with their left hand, and M key
with their right hand. The cue remained onscreen until it was
replaced by the outcome (1500 ms after the prediction). The
participant was informed about the occurrence (or non-occur-
rence) of the side effect (the outcome) by means of a picture of a
face showing or not the outcome and a written message (the labels
for the two side effects were ‘‘pruritis’’ and ‘‘eritemia’’, for the two
contingency conditions, and the assignation of labels to contin-
gency conditions was balanced). The picture and the message were
replaced after 1500 ms by a payoff message. ‘‘You earn [lose] 100
[500] points’’. All correct predictions were rewarded, and all
incorrect ones were penalized; however, the amount of reward/
penalty was selected randomly (100/500 points) in each trial. As
noted above, this delayed payoff had no other function than
extending the participant’s attention to the relevance of the
feedback for a longer period. The intertrial interval varied
randomly between 650 and 3000 ms.
The fixed 1500 ms prediction-outcome interval is justified on
the basis of previous literature. On the one hand, most studies on
the SPN set longer intervals (about 2000 ms), but differential
effects are evident by the middle of that period (see [7–10]). On the
other hand, long intervals make the detection of contingencies
more difficult [11]. So, the interval was set to allow for
contingency detection without affecting the possibility to detect
differences between conditions in the SPN effect.
As noted above, the main manipulation involved the degree of
statistical relationship (computed as contingency) between the drug
and the side effect. In one condition, the side effect was predictable
on the basis of the presence or absence of the drug; in the other,
the occurrence of the side effect was not predictable from the
presence or the absence of the drug. In other words, each
participant did the task twice, with two different contingency levels
Figure 1. Timing of the events in each trial of the HCL learning task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040252.g001
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difference between the probability of the outcome in the presence
of the cue [P(O/C)] and the probability of the outcome when the
cue is absent [P(O/no C)]. In the positive contingency condition
(hereafter, middle uncertainty, MidU, condition), the probability
of occurrence of the outcome in patients who had taken the drug
was.75, whereas the probability of the outcome in patients who
had not taken the drug was.25. In the null contingency condition
(hereafter, maximum uncertainty, MaxU, condition), on the other
hand, both probabilities were.50.
Each contingency task consisted of 256 trials, and the task was
interrupted after every 64 trial-block for the participant to judge
the strength of the causal relationship between the cue and the
outcome. Judgments were collected by using a scale bar with a
cursor the participant could slide to indicate any value between -
10 (the drug prevents the side effect to occur to a maximum
degree) and +10 (the drug causes the side effect to a maximum
degree), with the value 0 indicating that the drug neither caused
nor prevented the side effect. In addition, the task was interrupted
randomly (on average, after every 19 trials) by a screenshot, blank
except for the sentence ‘‘Please let your eyes rest for 10 seconds’’,
after which the task resumed.
Both predictions and judgments were collected for analysis.
Causal judgments were submitted to a 2 (Uncertainty condition:
MaxU, MinU) x 4 (Block: 1–4) ANOVA. On the other hand, the
observed probability of a positive prediction (‘‘the side effect with
occur’’) in the presence of the drug, and the probability of positive
prediction in the absence of the drug, were averaged for each 32-
trial sub-block. These averaged observed probabilities were
submitted to a 2 (Cue: cue-present trials, cue-absent trials) x 2
(Uncertainty condition: MaxU, MinU) x 8 (Sub-block: 1–8)
within-subject ANOVA. In all cases, the Greenhouse-Geisser
correction was used for assessing statistical significance.
EEG Recording
EEGs were recorded from 61 scalp locations using tin electrodes
arranged according to the extended 10–20 system mounted on an
elastic cap (Brain Products, Inc), and referenced online to FCz.
Vertical and horizontal eye activity were recorded from one
monopolar electrode placed below the left eye, and two bipolar
electrodes located in a straight line at the outer canthi of the left
and right eye. Two of the scalp electrodes were attached to
mastoids. All electrode impedances during recording were below 5
kV. EEG and EOG were sampled at 1000 Hz and amplified using
a.016-1000 Hz band-pass filter. Subsequently, all EEG recordings
were downsampled to 250 Hz, band-pass filtered using a.016–
25 Hz 12db/octave, re-referenced offline to average activity of the
mastoids electrodes, and FCz activity was recovered. Offline signal
preprocessing was done using BrainVision Analyzer 2.0 software
(Brain Products Inc, Munich, Germany).
ERP Extraction and Analysis
Two 1900 ms segments were extracted offline. The first one
(SPN-Outcome) was time-locked to the predictive response, with a
200 ms pre-response baseline. The segments lasted from 200 ms
before the prediction to 200 ms post-outcome onset. The second
one (SPN-Payoff) was time-locked to the onset of the outcome,
with a 200 ms pre-outcome baseline, and so it lasted until 200 ms
post-payoff onset. These SPN-Outcome and SPN-Payoff epochs
were corrected for ocular artifacts using the Gratton-Coles
algorithm [24]. Other artifacts were subsequently removed using
an automatic rejection procedure: segments were excluded for the
remaining analyses when amplitudes were outside the +/2100 mV
range [25]. Please note that the filtering setting used here (.016–
25 Hz) allows for significant drifting of the raw EEG, so that if a
more restricted rejection criterion had been used, too many
correct trials would have been unnecessarily rejected. On average,
a 82% (minimum=114) of trials were retained for further
processing after the artifact correction procedure.
After artifact correction, an SPN-Outcome score was computed for
each participant and condition, as the difference between the
average amplitude in the interval between 1300 and 1500 ms after
the predictive response (or, what amounts to be the same, during
the 200 ms prior to outcome onset) and a baseline defined as the
average amplitude between 1000 and 800 ms prior to outcome
(see [7–8] for similar partitions). Similarly, an SPN-Payoff score was
computed as the difference between the average amplitude
between 1300 and 1500 ms after the outcome (the 200 ms prior
to payoff onset), and a baseline defined as the average amplitude
between 1000 and 800 ms prior to payoff.
Both SPN analyses were carried out on recordings from
electrodes Fp1, Fpz, Fp2, F3, Fz, F4, FC3, FCz, FC4, C3, Cz,
C4, P3, Pz and P4. SPN-Outcome scores were submitted to a 2
(Uncertainty: MidU and MaxU) x 5 (Location: Prefrontal, Frontal,
Frontocentral, Central, and Parietal) x 3 (Laterality: Left, Middle,
Right) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA; aimed to
control for correlations between electrodes, [26]). SPN-Payoff
scores were submitted to a 2 (Uncertainty: MaxU, MinU) x 2
(Valence: Positive and Negative payoff) x 5 (Location: Prefrontal,
Frontal, Frontocentral, Central, and Parietal) x 3 (Laterality: Left,
Middle, Right) multivariate analysis of variance. Statistical results
are given as F approximations to Wilks’ lambda. Two-tailed paired
samples t-tests were used for comparisons of interest. Task order
was not included as a factor because neither main effects nor
interactive ones were significant either in behavioral measures
(prediction responses, all p.0.10; causal judgments, all p.0.16) or
in SPN amplitudes (all p.0.41).
Cortical Localization
Standardized Low-Resolution Electromagnetic Tomography
(sLORETA, [27–28]) was used for estimating the 3-D cortical
distribution of current density underlying scalp activity. In the
current implementation of sLORETA, computations were done
using the MNI152 template, with the 3-D space solution restricted
to cortical gray matter, according to the probabilistic Talairach
atlas. The cortical gray matter is partitioned in 6239 voxels at
5 mm spatial resolution. Brodmann anatomical labels are reported
using MNI space. Standardized sLORETA current source
densities with no regularization method were obtained from 60
channels for each participant in each condition and for each time
point in the SPN-Outcome and SPN-Payoff time windows.
Source location followed a rationale adapted to the aim of the
study: if current source density at a certain location is interpreted
as an estimate of cortical activation, a significant correlation
between current source density at a certain voxel and the
magnitude of SPN (in a given uncertainty condition) can be taken
as an indication of the involvement of such voxel in generation of
the SPN (in that condition). Hence, the correlations between
voxelwise current densities and SPN magnitudes can be used to
identify the areas involved in the generation of SPN.
In summary, cortical localization analysis was carried out as
follows. First, a single measure of the activation of each voxel (with
a 5 mm spatial resolution) for the SPN interval was computed, by
averaging voxel activations across that interval (200 ms preceding
the outcome onset). Second, we computed the correlation between
that estimated current density and the magnitude of the SPN
effect, for each voxel and each condition, across participants. And
third, those areas in which at least 10 voxels were found to
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for a similar procedure with behavioral data).
Finally, we were interested in checking how the estimated
activations in the areas involved in SPN-outcome are related to
one another, in order to get an idea of the possible shape of the
brain network for expectancy and uncertainty processing (see [29],
for a similar approach). Current source densities were first
averaged across significant voxels within each previously identified
brain area. The averages of the activations of the significant voxels
within each selected brain area (see below) were submitted to a
structural equation models analysis (SEM). SEM [30–31] serves
purposes similar to multiple regression, but in a more powerful
manner, as it allows to test whether the data are consistent with a
model, including a causal one. A SEM model is composed by
observed/latent variables and connection arrows. Directional
arrows represent causal direction, and bidirectional arrows stands
for correlation between the connected variables. SEM can be used
both in a confirmatory way (to test the goodness-of-fit of an a priori
defined model) and in an exploratory approach (i.e. to compare
several models that usually differ in the number of connections). In
both cases the goodness-of-fit indices test whether the proposed
matrix of connections accounts for the observed pattern of
variances/covariances. Thus, SEM is well suited to test the
hypothesis that different brain networks account for the SPN
differences observed as a function of our uncertainty manipulation.
We made separate SEM analyses for each one of the two
uncertainty conditions. As we do not have a priori information on
the relationship between these areas, we tested 24 of all the
possible models involving the brain locations selected after the
cortical location step. Following literature recommendations [30–
31], several goodness-of-fit tests were used to identify the most
explanatory models: Model Chi-square (CMIN), Root Mean Square
Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI),
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI), and Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC). For a given set of models, we will consider one as better if it
outperforms the others in at least three of these indices. Thus, for
each uncertainty condition, we presented only the best fitting
model.
Results
Behavioral Measures
Two separate analyses of variance were done for causal
judgments and predictions. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction
was used for assessing statistical significance. A 2 (within subjects,
Uncertainty: MidU, MaxU) x 4 (within subjects, Block:1–4)
ANOVA on causal judgments yielded main effects of Uncertainty,
F(1, 21)=60.82, MSE=14.58, p,.01, g
2=.74, and the Uncer-
tainty x Block interaction, F(3, 63)=5.24, MSE=8.42, p,.01,
g
2=.20. The left panel of Figure 2 displays mean judgments across
blocks for the two Uncertainty conditions. Bonferroni post-hoc
comparisons in the interaction yielded significant differences
between the two Uncertainty conditions for blocks 2, 3, and 4,
but not for Block 1 (p=.039). Trend analyses only revealed a linear
component in the MidU condition, F(1, 21)=6.90, MSE=11.28,
p=.02.
For the analysis of participants’ predictions, we computed the
observed probability of a positive prediction (‘‘the outcome will
occur’’) both in cue-present, P(Yes/Cue) and cue-absent, P(Yes/
No cue) trials across 32-trial sub-blocks (8 sub-blocks per
contingency condition). A 2 (within subjects, Uncertainty: MidU,
MaxU) x 2 (within subjects, Cue: present, absent) x 8 (within
subjects, Block: 1–8) ANOVA on those probabilities showed neat
sensitivity to Uncertainty. On the one hand, positive predictions
were more likely in cue-present than in cue-absent trials, F(1,
21)=56.20, MSE=.69, p,.001, g
2=.73, although that difference
was larger, for MidU than for the MaxU condition, F(1,
21)=5.39, MSE=.19, p,.01, g
2=.57. As can be seen in the
right panel of Figure 2, the probability of a positive prediction
approached 1.00 in cause-present trials, and.00 in cause-absent
trials in the MidU condition, whereas those probabilities remained
far from the probability scale ends in the MaxU condition. In
addition, this pattern becomes neater as training proceeds, as
shown by a significant Uncertainty x Cue occurrence x Block
interaction, F(7, 147)=3.93, MSE=.04, p,.01, g
2=.16. These
results qualitatively match previous reports of experiments with a
similar procedure (see [32]).
SPN-Outcome
SPN-Outcome scores were submitted to a 2 (Uncertainty: MidU
and MaxU) x 5 (Location: Prefrontal, Frontal, Frontocentral,
Central, and Parietal) x 3 (Laterality: Left, Middle, Right)
multivariate analysis of variance. This analysis yielded significant
main effects of Uncertainty, F(1,21)=7.43, p,.02, g
2=.26,
Location, F(4,18)=6.05, p,.01, g
2=.57, and Laterality,
F(2,20)=11.68, p,.01, g
2=.54. [The analysis of the SPN-
Outcome after removing the two left-handed participants showed
the same pattern of significance. Uncertainty: F(1,19)=6.56,
p,0.02; Location F(4,16)=6.14, p,0.01, Laterality
F(2,18)=10.84, p,0.01. That was also the case for results
regarding SPN-Payoff scores. Uncertainty x Value:
F(1,19)=8.76, p,0.01. Importantly, given that the ratio of left-
hand and right-hand responses was the same for the two
uncertainty conditions (left-hand: 133 and 133, right-hand: 134
and 126, respectively for MaxU and MidU conditions), it seems
clear that post-movement potentials cannot account for SPN
uncertainty differences.] 81.8% of participants showed less
negative SPN scores (smaller in absolute value) for the MidU
condition than for the MaxU one [t(21)=2.73, p,.02]. According
to Bonferroni correction, SPN scores for Frontopolar channels
were higher than those for frontal sites (p=.02). SPN scores were
lower for left than for central and right channels (all p,.01). No
other differences were close to significance. Mean SPN-Outcome
scores for the two conditions, averaged across sides and locations
are displayed in Figure 3 (a). Figure 3 (b) displays the waveforms for
the two uncertainty conditions (clearly showing a steeper and more
pronounced SPN for the MaxU condition), for the selected
electrodes, and the topographical map of the differences between
MaxU and MidU conditions in the SPN interval (c).
As noted in the Methods section, a single measure of the
activation of each voxel (with a 5 mm spatial resolution) for the
SPN interval (200 ms preceding the outcome onset) was firstly
computed, by averaging activations for that interval. Second, we
computed the correlation between that estimated current density
and the magnitude of the SPN effect, for each voxel and each
condition, across participants. And third, those areas in which at
least 10 voxels were found to correlate significantly with the SPN
scores were identified.
Table 1 displays the list of areas identified by using this method.
Brodmann areas and coordinates (MNI space) correspond to the
voxels where current density-SPN relationship (R
2) was maximal,
for each area and each condition. For the MaxU condition,
current source density covaried with SPN magnitude in the
DLPFC (BA9) the ACC (BA24), the insula (BA13), and the parietal
cortex (BA40). In the MinU condition, current source density
covaried with SPN magnitude in the Insula (BA13), and the
parietal cortex (BA40).
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SPN-Payoff scores were submitted to a 2 (Uncertainty: MaxU,
MinU) x 2 (Valence: Positive and Negative payoff) x 5 (Location:
Prefrontal, Frontal, Frontocentral, Central, and Parietal) x 3
(Laterality: Left, Middle, Right) multivariate analysis of variance.
The MANOVA on the SPN-Payoff scores showed main effects of
Location, F(4,18)=13.38, g
2=.75, p,.01, and Laterality, F(2,
20)=16.87, p,.01, g
2=.63. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that
Figure 2. Behavioral results. Left panel: Mean causal judgments across the four 64-trial blocks, for the two uncertainty conditions (MaxU; MidU).
Right panel: Probability of a positive prediction (‘‘the outcome will occur’’) in the presence and the absence of the cue, averaged across trials, for each
32-trial sub-block and the two uncertainty conditions. Error bars denote standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040252.g002
Figure 3. SPN-Outcome magnitude and SCP. (a) Magnitude of the SPN-Outcome for the two uncertainty conditions during the prediction-
outcome interval. Error bars denote standard errors of the mean. (b) SCP waveforms for the prediction-outcome interval in the selected electrodes
and the two uncertainty conditions (MaxU, MinU). (c) Topographical map of the MaxU-MidU difference.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040252.g003
Expectancy, Uncertainty, and SPN
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 July 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 7 | e40252SPN-Payoff was larger at frontocentral, central and parietal
channels than at the remaining locations (all p,.03), and at right
and central than at left hemisphere channels (all p,.02). Neither
feedback valence nor the uncertainty manipulation showed
significant effects. However, there was a significant Uncertainty
x Valence interaction, F(1,21)=11.28, p,.01, g
2=.35. The
difference between positive and negative payoffs was not
significant either for the MidU condition, t(21)=1.86, p=.08 or
for the MaxU one, t(21)=1.63, p=.12. The SPN-Payoff score was
significantly larger for MaxU than for MidU only for the positive
Payoff condition, t(21)=2.28, p,=.04 [see Figure 4].
As we did with the SPN-Outcome, we identified the areas in
which the SPN-Payoff score (computed from positive feedback
trials only, as the difference between MaxU and MinU conditions
was significant only for these trials) covaried with current source
density. As shown in Table 2, in the MidU condition, the SPN-
Payoff score significantly correlated with estimated current
densities in BA24, BA13 and BA40. On the other hand, in the
MaxU condition, the SPN-Payoff significantly correlated with the
estimated current density in BA39 and BA40.
Structural Equations Modeling (SEM)
For the SEM analysis, we used the average activity of significant
voxels of the four areas involved in the generation of SPN-
Outcome in the MaxU condition: dorsal ACC (BA24), DLPFC
(BA9), Insula (BA13), and Parietal cortex (BA40). Following the
rationale described in the Methods section, the model that best
accounts for co-activation in the MaxU condition (Model 1)
resulted to be the one depicted in the left panel of Figure 5. The
one that best accounts for co-activation in the MidU condition is
displayed in the right panel of Figure 5 (Model 2). Fitting
parameters for the two models and the two conditions are shown
in Table 3.
Discussion
Summary of Results and Theoretical Implications
Behavioral results showed the expected pattern, which is a
requisite for SCP interpretation. Both judgments and predictive
responses showed that people discriminate between contingencies.
In most other causal learning tasks (see [33] for a review),
judgments in zero-contingency condition (MaxU) are slightly
higher than in the present case, that is, people tend to perceive low
to moderate positive contingencies where there is not any. Still, in
our case, even judging the cue-outcome causal relation as virtually
inexistent, participants kept on responding ‘‘yes’’ slightly more
often in cue-present than in cue-absent trials (which can be a
manifestation of the well-known bias in favor of positive
contingency [34]).
Participants’ judgments and predictions fully corroborated their
behavioral sensitivity to our key uncertainty manipulation. In
Table 1. Brain locations in which current source density was
significantly correlated (R
2) with SPN-Outcome score, at least
in one of the two uncertainty conditions (MaxU, MinU).
Label BA k X Y Z R
2
Max Uncertainty
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 9 8 250 0 25 0.30*
Insula 13 19 230 240 20 0.28*
Anterior Cingulate 24 26 253 0 25 0.27*
Supramarginal Gyrus 40 30 255 260 30 0.40*
Mid Uncertainty
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 9 1 245 10 30 0.10
Insula 13 15 240 240 20 0.29*
Cingulate Gyrus 24 1 25 220 40 0.14
Inferior Parietal 40 93 245 245 55 0.40*
Note: *p,.05. BA: Brodmann area. X, Y, and Z coordinates are in MNI space for
the voxel with the maximal relationship with SPN-Outcome score (R
2). k is the
cluster size in voxels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040252.t001
Figure 4. SPN-Payoff magnitude. Uncertainty x Payoff interaction
on the SPN-Payoff score. Error bars denote standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040252.g004
Table 2. Brain locations in which current source density was
significantly correlated (R
2) with SPN-Payoff score, at least in
one of the two uncertainty conditions (MaxU, MinU).
Anatomic Label BA k X Y Z R
2
Max Uncertainty
Inferior Parietal 40 104 240 265 45 .45*
39 58 35 265 40 .28*
Insula 13 1 45 240 20 .05
Cingulate Gyrus 24 1 5 5 30 .15
Mid Uncertainty
Inferior Parietal 40 45 255 230 25 .47*
39 1 55 260 25 .04
Insula 13 5 35 20 15 .25*
Cingulate Gyrus 24 67 20 295 215 .40*
Note: *p,.05. BA: Brodmann area. X, Y, and Z coordinates are in MNI space for
the voxel with the maximal relationship with SPN-Payoff score (R
2). k is the
cluster size in voxels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040252.t002
Expectancy, Uncertainty, and SPN
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 July 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 7 | e40252parallel with this, SCP results show that the SPN-Outcome is
larger when the upcoming event (the outcome) is uncertain than
when it is relatively predictable. In the uncertain condition
(MaxU, null contingency), its magnitude directly correlates with
current source density in prefrontal areas (ACC and DLPFC). In
the predictable condition (MidU,.50-contingency), however, the
magnitude of the SPN correlates with estimated activity in the
parietal cortex (BA40) and the insula (BA13). Complementarily,
once the uncertainty is resolved, and the individual stays waiting
for the corresponding payoff for her right or wrong prediction, the
main effect of the contingency manipulation on the SPN score
disappears, and only a significant feedback valence effect in the
MidU condition remains. In accordance with previous reports, this
Payoff-SPN effect seems to have posterior sources, including again
parietal areas and the insular cortex.
Therefore, our opening hypothesis that the amplitude of the
SPN preceding uncertain upcoming events would be larger than
the one preceding predictable events has been supported. The
areas responsible for increased activity associated to uncertainty
(DLPFC and ACC) are known to be involved in the control and
monitoring of learned behavior. Note, however, that control takes
place before the response (for example, when an individual has to
consider the potential costs and benefits of response choices [35]);
and monitoring takes place after the feedback, that is, when a choice is
rewarded/penalized, or a prediction confirmed/disconfirmed [36–
37]. Non-contaminated psychological uncertainty arises after the
prediction, but before the outcome, that is, when the result of the
prediction is at stake.
The posterior parietal areas we have observed to be directly
correlated with predictability have also been frequently related to
selective attention [38], and memory encoding and recollection
[39]. So, posterior parietal areas seem to be involved in codifying
the associative evocation or facilitation of the features of the
upcoming event. Our data thus suggest that prefrontal (DLPFC
and ACC) and more posterior (insular and parietal) cortices could
play different roles in a network engaged in expectancy/
uncertainty computation. The fact that posterior areas correlate
with outcome predictability shows their potential involvement in
the associative re-enactment of the perceptual and hedonic
properties of the outcome. When these areas fail to generate
expectancy, that is, when the outcome has been learnt to be
unpredictable, the prefrontal areas are probably responsible for
accruing and reacting to uncertainty. This model is compatible
with the SEM models depicted in Figure 5. In the best-fitting
model for the MaxU condition there appears to be a single active
fronto-posterior connection (from the DLPFC to the parietal),
whereas in the best-fitting model of the MidU condition, two of the
four possible fronto-posterior connections appear to be active.
Although the idea is still rather tentative, these connections could
implement successful attempts to associatively activate the
emotional and perceptual features of the upcoming outcome.
Please note, however, that coactivations – as depicted by our
SEM models – do not strictly correspond to anatomical
projections among areas. First, the fact that two areas are
anatomically connected does not imply that there must be an
active connection between the two within the interval of interest
(which is only a fragment of the whole period). Our SEM models
represent coactivations among areas, and have been induced from
the window of interest only. And second, it is important to take
into account that both the ACC and the insula are complex
structures with several subdivisions. The dorsal part of the ACC
(the part activated in our study) is interconnected with the DLPFC,
the parietal cortices, and the SMA [40]. The posterior part of the
insula, on the other hand, is connected with parietal and temporal
cortices, but not that strongly with the ACC [41].
Integration with Previous Evidence
First, the uncertainty hypothesis is not incompatible with
previous studies on the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in
learning cue-reward and response-reward associations [35,42–44].
On the one hand, unexpected outcomes are known to generate
prefrontal activation that quantitatively mirrors prediction error,
and this prediction error is necessary to update the associative link
between the cue and the outcome [45–47]. However, in the basic
associative framework, non-correlated events are assumed to
generate no new learning. In contrast with this idea, a number of
studies show that non-correlation generates the actual belief that
Table 3. Fitting-quality parameters, for the models of co-
activation identified by SEM analysis
1, and the two uncertainty
conditions.
Model NPAR CMIN RMSEA NFI PNFI AIC
Maximum Uncertainty (MaxU)
MaxU 7 2.34 .00 .94 .47 16.33
MidU 9 0.70 .00 .99 .16 18.69
1NPAR, number of parameters in the model,;AIC, Akaike Information Criterion;
CMIN, Chi-square; NFI, (Bentler-Bonett) normed fit index; PNFI, parsimony
normed fit index; RMSEA, root mean square error of approximation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040252.t003
Figure 5. Graphical depiction of SEM results: brain networks for uncertainty and expectancy. Best-fitting models accounting for co-
activation in the MaxU (top panel) and the MinU (bottom panel) conditions, according to the structural equation model (SEM) analysis. All the solid
arrows are significant at p,.03. Dashed arrows, Model 1 p=.08, Model 2 p=.18.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040252.g005
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[49–50]). In our experiment, non-contingency generated a belief
of causal inefficacy, and, simultaneously, an incremented pre-
outcome SPN effect. Although the precise role of this uncertainty-
related SPN remains speculative, informal reports by our
participants in non-contingency conditions reveal attempts to find
a way to predict the outcome, alternative to mere conditioned
expectancy. Our intuition is that uncertainty motivates such
attempts, which generates the prefrontal activity observed in SPN.
In that sense, our proposal is that the involvement of prefrontal
cortex in uncertainty perception has more to do with learning non-
contingency than with learning contingency. This idea in not
incompatible with the dominant associative expectancy approach,
but certainly complements it.
Second, some studies attribute a direct role in the pre-outcome
uncertainty to the midbrain dopaminergic system. For example,
Mattox et al. [51] compared the SPN of patients suffering the
Parkinson disease (in which the midbrain dopaminergic system is
severely damaged) with that of healthy controls, using the weather
prediction task. As expected, the SPN in controls was larger for the
difficult condition (3 cue cards), than for the simple condition (1
card). More interestingly, the SPN in patients was unrelated to task
difficulty. This pattern is compatible, again, with the implication of
uncertainty in the SPN, but also points out to the implication of
pre-feedback dopamine release in its generation (see [52], for
similar results on healthy participants under challenge with the
dopamine agonist metilphenidate).
Animal studies corroborate this last idea. Fiorillo et al. [53]
registered the activity of midbrain neurons in monkeys, from the
onset of the cue to the expected time of the outcome. The function
relating expectancy and those neurons’ activity was inverted U-
shaped, with the maximal activation for the highest uncertainty
and lowest for total certainty (for example when the cue was
always followed by the outcome). Interestingly, the activity peak
occurred at the time of the expected outcome, which, according to
these authors, corresponds to the time of greatest uncertainty (see
also [54]).
And third, our results can cast new light on some previous,
apparently contrary results. Damen and Brunia [55] used a time
estimation task to compare the SPN elicited by knowledge of
results and the one elicited by task instructions. The fact that only
knowledge of results (KR feedback) elicited a reliable SPN led
these authors to conclude that SPN is only caused by upcoming
stimuli correlated with the preceding response. Alternatively, it has
been proposed that pre-feedback and the pre-instruction SPN are
functionally different [56]. However, it seems also plausible to
assume that upcoming task instructions do not engage the
expectancy brain network. That is, in Damen and Brunia’s
control condition people did not learn to predict based on the
received instructions, especially because, from the very beginning,
it was clearly stated that responses and instructions were unrelated.
In the time estimation task in Kotani et al’s study [9], the
stimulus to be predicted varied across conditions in two
dimensions: the informational richness of the feedback provided
(just correct/incorrect, or more detailed information on the degree
of correctness) and the motivational significance of feedback
(monetary reward, or just information). The authors observed an
increased SPN in the high information/monetary reward condi-
tion – when compared with the other three –. The contribution of
information richness to SPN is easily explainable in terms of
uncertainty. With standard feedback, only two results are possible
(correct/incorrect); in the rich feedback condition there are 7
possible results (depending on the degree of correctness), so
uncertainty is objectively higher in the rich information condition.
However, the effect of information was significant only in the
reward condition (namely, when real money was at stake), which is
compatible with the idea that the effect of uncertainty increases
when the individual is highly motivated. Nevertheless, motivation
and uncertainty are related, but separable dimensions. As noted
above, the areas responsible for increased activity associated to
uncertainty (DLPFC and ACC) are known to be involved in
effortful control. Effort is unnecessary if a prediction is generated
easily, via associative evocation, in the low uncertainty condition.
And the other way round, if the result is uncertain but
motivationally irrelevant, there will be no effort investment either.
Both motivation and uncertainty are necessary conditions for the
investment of mental effort during the prediction-feedback
interval. This connection between motivation and uncertainty
justifies the involvement of the dopaminergic system.
However, being motivated to predict an uncertain but
hedonically relevant stimulus, and to be able to evocate the
hedonic (aversive or appetitive) properties of the upcoming event
are essentially different processes (see [10,57]). Actually, there have
been attempts to demonstrate that the SPN is generated by
hedonic evocation. For example, in a decision making task, Masaki
et al. [8] compared a condition in which people had to learn to
select the most profitable choice from an array (the choice
condition) against a condition in which they knew in advance
rewards were delivered at random (the no-choice condition). As
expected, the choice condition elicited a larger SPN than the no-
choice one. These results can be interpreted, as authors did,
assuming that SPN is an index of expectation for reinforcement.
However, it seems also reasonable to assume that only participants
in the choice condition were engaged in the computation of the
action-reward causal link. So, once more, the level of psychological
uncertainty, and not only the level of expected reward, was
different in the two conditions.
On this regard, the null results from Ohgami et al [57] using a
time estimation task are also at least partially compatible with our
interpretation. The main manipulation in that study comprised the
hedonic consequences of feedback (only reward, only punishment,
combined, or neutral). There was no manipulation of uncertainty
in this case, but, strictly speaking, there was no effect of the
motivational significance manipulation either (but a laterality x
feedback type interaction, by virtue of which interhemispheric
differences vanished in the reward condition). As noted earlier, if
we take that interaction as evidence of the contribution of hedonic
anticipation to SPN, it would not be incompatible with our results,
but complementary. Still, the fact that the effect was less intense
and more elusive in this case that in other experiments seems to
imply that the potential effect of uncertainty (when it is
manipulated) on the SPN is larger than the mere effect of hedonic
evocation.
Summarizing previous evidence, in most SPN studies carried
out to date, there has been a chance for uncertainty to influence
the key contrasts. As noted above, for uncertainty to have
psychological and physiological entity, the network responsible for
expectancy computation must engage in predicting the outcome,
and then fail to do so. However, it is important to acknowledge
that the prefrontal areas showing more activity in our high
uncertainty condition, and the ones involved in representing
expected rewards are not overlapping, so the previously cited
results are complementary, rather than contradictory, with ours.
Our results are not incompatible with the involvement of
prefrontal cortex in computing prediction error, but, at the same
time, points out to the insufficiency of the expectancy generation/
violation mechanism assumed to be responsible for learning in all
associative models. As noted above, both animal and human
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with pre-outcome dopaminergic activity. Our results demonstrate
that prefrontal structures are also part of this brain mechanism of
uncertainty computation.
Conclusion
The main result of the present study is the demonstration that
psychological uncertainty crucially contributes to SPN, and the
potential involvement of DLPFC and ACC in the generation of
such psychological and physiological activity. Thus, the SPN can
be considered a manifestation of part of a broad mechanism for
adaptive behavior. At a cortical level, the network responsible for
expectancy/uncertainty generation would include the anterior
cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, posterior parietal
areas, and the insula. Part of this network is probably responsible
for generating expectancy, that is, the anticipated representation of
the hedonic and perceptual features of the upcoming event.
However, there is another part, the most anterior one, coming into
action when the learner has been unable to predict the outcome in
the past, or, what amounts to be the same, when the upcoming
event is perceived as uncertain. Consequently, the SPN arises as a
tool to study the interaction of uncertainty with other processes,
and, more specifically, the role of uncertainty in normal and
pathological decision making, a possibility recently proposed in the
fields of behavioral economics and neuroeconomics [58–59].
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